Confirmed Stolen

What to do

What to do when your domain name is stolen

A calm, ordered guide for business owners and domain investors whose domain was transferred without authorization.

The short answer

If your domain name is stolen, secure the email account tied to your registrar first, then contact the registrar's abuse or security team, ask for the domain to be locked, and preserve every record of the domain's ownership and settings. From there, escalation runs through a registrar-to-registrar transfer dispute, an ICANN Contractual Compliance complaint, the courts and a police or FBI IC3 report. Speed matters, because a domain taken from its owner can be resold or moved again within days.

Stolen domain checklist

Tick each step as you finish it; your progress is saved in this browser only. For a paper copy, download the free PDF.

Download the free PDF PDF, 118 KB · printable, with space for report numbers

In the first hour

Within 24 hours

This week

Prevent it happening again

This checklist is general information, not legal advice. Agencies change their procedures, so confirm each step with the organization named.

A hooded figure at a laptop with lines of code, illustrating a domain name taken over through a compromised account

How domain names get stolen

Domain theft rarely involves a technical breakthrough. In most cases, the person taking the domain gains control of something the owner already relies on: an email inbox, a phone number, a registrar account or a forgotten DNS setting.

Registrar account takeover

The most common route is a takeover of the registrar account (the account at the company that manages your registration, such as the one you pay for renewals). Attackers usually compromise the email address tied to the account, then use password reset links to get in. Phishing pages that imitate registrar login screens, reused passwords exposed in earlier breaches and SIM swaps (when a criminal persuades a mobile carrier to move your number to their SIM card, capturing your text-message codes) all lead to the same result: the attacker controls the account and can unlock the domain, obtain the transfer authorization code (the AuthInfo or EPP code a registrar issues to move a domain) and move it.

Social engineering of the registrar

Some thefts involve no password at all. An attacker contacts registrar support, impersonates the owner with forged documents or convincing personal details, and persuades staff to change the account email or approve a transfer.

Unauthorized change of registrant

A change of registrant (the reassignment of who legally holds the domain) can take ownership without moving the domain to a new registrar. Once the registrant record names someone else, the original owner has a harder time proving the domain was theirs.

Lame delegation hijacking

A lame delegation occurs when a domain points at a DNS provider that no longer hosts its zone. An attacker opens an account at that provider, claims the zone and controls where the domain resolves, all without a registrar login. Ownership on paper does not change, but the website and email now answer to someone else.

Expired-domain mishandling

When renewal notices go to an abandoned inbox or a payment card expires, a domain can lapse, enter deletion and be registered by someone else. This is a loss, not always a theft, but it is often mistaken for one, and it is sometimes engineered by an insider or a former vendor who controlled the contact email.

Theft, expiration or DNS outage: how to tell the difference

A domain that stops working is not always a stolen domain. Before escalating, confirm what changed. An RDAP lookup (Registration Data Access Protocol, the modern replacement for WHOIS) through ICANN Lookup shows the registrar, key dates, nameservers and status codes.

  • Theft usually shows a new registrar of record, a new registrant, a recent updated date you cannot explain or nameservers you did not set.
  • Expiration usually shows your own registrar still in place, a past expiration date and statuses such as redemption or pending delete.
  • A DNS outage usually shows your registrar, your registrant details and your nameservers unchanged, while the DNS host itself is failing or misconfigured.

Lame delegation sits between these categories. The registration looks normal, yet the nameservers point to a provider where someone else now controls the zone. If your records look unchanged but the site or email behaves strangely, check the zone at the DNS provider directly.

Why the email account comes first

The email account tied to your registrar is the master key. Whoever controls it can reset the registrar password, approve transfers and receive the notices meant to warn you. If you contact the registrar while the attacker still reads that inbox, they may see your ticket, reply as you or move the domain again.

Secure the inbox from a device you trust. Change the password, sign out all sessions, review recovery phone numbers and backup addresses, delete forwarding rules and filters you did not create, and turn on MFA (multi-factor authentication, a second proof of identity beyond the password). If the mobile number on file was moved through a SIM swap, recover the number with your carrier as part of the same step. The hacked accounts guide covers this process in more detail.

Only then contact the registrar's abuse or security desk. Ask them to lock the domain, freeze changes and record your report. Record every ticket number.

Documenting and preserving evidence

Every escalation path depends on evidence. Registrars, ICANN, courts and police all ask the same question: can you show the domain was yours and that it was moved without your authorization?

  • Registration records: current RDAP and WHOIS output, plus any historical WHOIS records showing you as registrant.
  • Screenshots: the registrar dashboard, the live website, DNS records and any listing offering the domain for sale, each with the date and time visible.
  • Messages: transfer approval emails, registrant change notices, login alerts and carrier messages, saved with full headers.
  • Ownership proof: invoices, renewal receipts, payment records, trademark filings and business records showing use of the domain.

Do not contact the current holder to negotiate, threaten or buy the domain back before you have preserved this record. Doing so can prompt a fast resale and can complicate later legal action.

Escalation paths after a domain is stolen

Each process has a specific purpose, and choosing the wrong one wastes time.

Registrar-to-registrar transfer dispute (TDRP)

The Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy (TDRP) is the ICANN process for contested transfers between registrars. It is filed by a registrar, not by the domain owner, so your role is to give your original registrar the evidence it needs and ask it to pursue the dispute or negotiate a return with the gaining registrar.

ICANN Contractual Compliance complaint

If a registrar ignores you or does not follow transfer rules, you can file a complaint with ICANN Contractual Compliance through icann.org. ICANN does not award domains, but it can require an accredited registrar to meet its obligations. The scale is measurable: ICANN Contractual Compliance, Transfer-Related Metrics records 780 complaints of unauthorized inter-registrar transfers from September 2020 through October 2023: 78 in late 2020, 323 in 2021, 195 in 2022 and 184 from January to October 2023. The same source logged 205 complaints of unauthorized change of registrant over that period, out of 13,630 transfer-related complaints overall. ICANN notes that it does not track hijacking as its own category, and that 2020 to 2021 volume was inflated by a failing registrar.

UDRP is for cybersquatting, not theft

The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) addresses trademark-based cybersquatting: a domain registered and used in bad faith that is confusingly similar to a trademark. Some theft victims with a trademark use it, but it is not a theft remedy as such, and owners of generic or investment domains without trademark rights may not qualify.

Courts

Civil litigation is available, including in rem actions (cases brought against the domain itself rather than a person) in courts where the registry is located. A lawyer can advise on whether it fits your facts.

Police and FBI IC3

File with local police and with the FBI at ic3.gov. These reports may not return the domain on their own, but they create an official record that registrars, insurers and courts take seriously.

Why speed matters

A domain taken from its owner is a liquid asset. The person who moved it may list it on a marketplace, sell it to a buyer who knows nothing of its history or transfer it again to put more distance between the domain and its owner.

Hijacked domains are also put to work quickly. In its 2025 phishing study, Interisle Consulting Group found that one in three .COM and .NET domains reported for phishing was a compromised, legitimate domain rather than one registered by criminals, while across all TLDs 77% of phishing domains were maliciously registered (May 2024 to April 2025). A stolen business domain can become the sender of fraudulent invoices within hours, which is why warning customers belongs in the first week.

Preventing domain theft: registry lock, DNSSEC and MFA

MFA protects the accounts, registry lock protects the registration and DNSSEC protects the answers your domain gives.

  • MFA: enable it on the registrar account, the linked email account and the DNS host, preferably with an authenticator app or hardware key rather than SMS.
  • Registry lock: a lock set at the registry that requires manual, out-of-band verification before transfers or changes are processed.
  • DNSSEC: Domain Name System Security Extensions, which sign DNS records so tampering can be detected.

Even large companies rarely use the strongest controls. According to CSC, 2024-2025 Domain Security Report, registry lock adoption among Forbes Global 2000 companies rose from 17% in 2020 to 24% in 2024, and DNSSEC deployment tripled from 3% in 2020 to 9% in 2024. This is vendor research, and CSC sells registry lock.

Stale DNS settings deserve the same attention as passwords. Infoblox Threat Intel reports that the threat actor it calls Vacant Viper has hijacked about 2,500 domains a year since December 2019 through lame delegation, that a second actor, Horrid Hawk, has hijacked nearly 5,000 domains for investment fraud since February 2023, and that over a dozen distinct actors exploit lame delegations. This is also vendor research. The fix is simple: remove nameserver delegations to any DNS provider that no longer hosts your zone.

The 2026 ICANN Transfer Policy change

ICANN's updated Transfer Policy took effect on August 4, 2026 for generic top-level domains. Under the change, the Registered Name Holder (the registrant) becomes the primary contact for approving transfers, replacing the Admin Contact, and WHOIS Data Reminder Policy (WDRP) notices go to the registrant, as summarized by Realtime Register.

For owners, the practical lesson is direct: the registrant email address is now the address that matters most. If it is outdated, shared with a former employee or vendor, or poorly secured, the transfer approval process is only as strong as that inbox. Review the registrant contact for every domain you hold, and check your registrar's current procedures.

The Confirmed Stolen list and reporting a stolen domain

Confirmed Stolen maintains a verified list of stolen domain names. Buyers, marketplaces and registrars can check it before a sale or transfer, which makes a domain taken from its owner harder to resell quietly.

If your domain was transferred without authorization, you can report it to Confirmed Stolen for verification. Include the domain, the approximate date of the unauthorized change and the evidence you preserved. Confirmed Stolen reviews reports before listing them. The site does not investigate, does not recover domains and does not provide legal advice, but a verified listing creates a public record that supports your registrar, ICANN and court efforts.

Frequently asked questions

Can a stolen domain name be recovered?

Often, yes, especially when the owner acts quickly and has strong evidence. Recovery usually comes through the original registrar working with the gaining registrar, a Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy filing by a registrar or a court order. Delay and repeated resale make it harder.

Who do I contact first when my domain is stolen?

Secure the email account tied to your registrar first, then contact your registrar's abuse or security desk using contact details from its official website. Ask for a lock on the domain and a ticket number.

Can I file a TDRP complaint myself?

No. The Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy is filed by a registrar. Your role is to give your original registrar the evidence it needs and ask it to pursue the dispute.

Does ICANN return stolen domains?

ICANN does not transfer domains back to owners. Its Contractual Compliance team reviews complaints about whether accredited registrars met their obligations, which can prompt action by a registrar that has not responded.

Is UDRP the right process for a stolen domain?

Usually not on its own. The UDRP addresses trademark-based cybersquatting. A theft victim with trademark rights in the domain may use it, but owners of generic or investment domains may not qualify.

How do I know if my domain expired or was stolen?

Run an RDAP lookup. A new registrar or registrant you did not authorize suggests theft. Your own registrar with a past expiration date and redemption or pending delete status suggests expiration.

Should I report a stolen domain to the police?

Yes. File with local police and with the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov. The reports create an official record that registrars, insurers and courts can rely on.

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